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I. INTRODUCTION 
A neighbor digs a ditch on his side of a property line, exposing root 
systems from two of the adjoining landowner’s trees. The neighbor then 
cuts off the exposed roots, leaving the trees unsupported and in danger 
of falling onto the house of their owner. Is the root cutter liable to the 
owner of the tree? 
The Washington Court of Appeals recently answered this question in 
Mustoe v. Ma.1 The Mustoe Court held that when a root-cutting neighbor 
removed encroaching tree roots, he owed no duty to the tree owner “to 
act in good faith and to act reasonably so as not to prevent damage to the 
trees.”2 And so the root cutter could not be held liable for that damage. 
This holding, though perhaps trivial-seeming, turns out to have 
troubling consequences. On a practical level, it gives the malicious a 
powerful weapon to wield against their neighbors. On the level of legal 
doctrine, the court’s analysis unsettles Washington’s law of nuisance. 
In what follows, I will summarize the facts of the case and the court 
                                                      
* Attorney, Keller Rohrback L.L.P., Seattle, Washington; J.D., Yale Law School. I am grateful to 
Erika Keech and Gavin Keene for their thoughts; all errors are mine. Full disclosure: after the 
issuance of Mustoe v. Ma, 193 Wash. App. 161, 371 P.3d 544 (2016), which this Article discusses, I 
entered an appearance in the Washington Court of Appeals on behalf of the plaintiff. As part of a 
settlement, no further review was sought.  
1. 193 Wash. App. 161, 371 P.3d 544 (2016). 
2. Id. at 165, 371 P.3d at 546. 
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of appeals’ holding,3 and then turn to how and why the court of appeals 
got the case wrong.4 I will close with some suggestions about how the 
court of appeals should have decided the case.5 
II. MUSTOE V. MA 
A. The Facts 
The court of appeals gave a terse account of the facts behind Mustoe. 
The plaintiff, Jennifer Mustoe, owned land in Rainier, Washington.6 She 
had two large Douglas fir trees on her property, both located only a 
couple of feet from the property line.7 Mustoe’s neighbor, Xiaoye Ma, 
owned the adjoining property, and Anthony Jordan lived on it with her.8 
One day, Jordan dug a ditch near, but on his side of, the property 
line.9 The ditch exposed roots from Mustoe’s two Douglas firs—roots 
that Jordan then cut off with a chainsaw.10 Jordan ended up severing 
nearly half of the trees’ roots, leaving the trees at high risk of falling 
over onto Mustoe’s home.11 The trees, valued at more than $16,000, had 
to be removed at a cost of about $4,000.12 
The court of appeals said nothing about why Jordan dug the ditch and 
cut off the protruding tree roots. Still, the record in the case does contain 
some suggestions. 
Mustoe testified that after she moved in, Jordan, who was already 
living next door, approached her, saying that he wanted to help fix up 
her house.13 His attentions made Mustoe uneasy, and he spent what 
Mustoe thought was too much time in her front yard.14 To gain some 
privacy, Mustoe built a fence between the properties.15 After that, Jordan 
“became increasingly hostile” to her.16 
                                                      
3. See infra Part II. 
4. See infra Part III. 
5. See infra Part IV. 
6. Mustoe, 193 Wash. App. at 163, 371 P.3d at 545. 
7. Id.  
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id.; Clerk’s Papers at 31, Mustoe, 193 Wash. App. 161, 371 P.3d 544 (No. 74166-7-I). 
11. Mustoe, 193 Wash. App. at 163–64, 371 P.3d at 545.  
12. See id. at 164, 371 P.3d at 545. 
13. See Clerk’s Papers at 44, Mustoe, 193 Wash. App. 161, 371 P.3d 544 (No. 74166-7-I). 
14. See id. at 44–45, 155.  
15. See id. at 44. 
16. Id. at 155. 
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Another neighbor, Michael Cameron, had a conversation with Jordan 
just before he dug the ditch and cut off the tree roots. According to 
Cameron, Jordan claimed that Mustoe’s two Douglas fir trees were 
“damaged and diseased.”17 Jordan, Cameron testified, said that he 
wanted to build “a structure to protect his house. He said he wanted the 
tree [sic] to fall on Jennifer Mustoe’s house. . . . Mr. Jordan said he was 
doing [the] structure to ‘piss off’ Jennifer Mustoe.”18 
If the testimony of Mustoe and Cameron is true, it suggests that 
Jordan resented Mustoe for rejecting his attentions. He then dug the 
ditch, hoping the trees would fall on Mustoe’s house. 
B. The Court of Appeals’ Decision 
Mustoe sued Jordan and Ma.19 She asserted a nuisance claim, as well 
as a claim under Washington’s timber-trespass statute.20 She also alleged 
that Jordan had “negligently, recklessly or intentionally” harmed the 
Douglas fir trees.21 The superior court dismissed all of Mustoe’s claims 
on summary judgment, and she appealed.22 
The court of appeals affirmed. Its opinion answered three questions. 
First, did Jordan, the root cutter, owe Mustoe, the tree owner, any duty 
of care in removing the tree roots? Second, could Mustoe bring a 
nuisance claim for the removal? Third, could she bring a claim under 
Washington’s timber-trespass statute? 
No duty of care. In deciding the duty-of-care issue, the court relied 
heavily on Gostina v. Ryland.23 In Gostina, where branches from a 
neighbor’s trees protruded into another landowner’s lot,24 the 
Washington State Supreme Court held that the owner of that lot had the 
right to cut the branches back to the shared property line.25 Gostina, the 
Mustoe Court said, “neither asserts nor implies” that, in removing 
                                                      
17. See id. at 137. An arborist later testified that there was no evidence of disease. Id. at 67–68. 
18. Id. at 137. 
19. Mustoe sued Ma on the theory that she knew or should have known that Jordan was removing 
the tree roots, and that she should have stopped him. See id. at 248–49 (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 318 & cmts. a–b (AM. LAW INST. 1965)). Whatever the merits of that theory, 
this Article will be focusing solely on whether Jordan, or a landowner who does what Jordan did, 
should be held liable. 
20. See Mustoe v. Ma, 193 Wash. App. 161, 168, 170, 371 P.3d 544, 547, 548 (2016). 
21. Clerk’s Papers at 7, 30, Mustoe, 193 Wash. App. 161, 371 P.3d 544 (No. 74166-7-I).  
22. See id. at 473–77. 
23. 116 Wash. 228, 199 P. 298 (1921). 
24. Id. at 229, 199 P. at 299. 
25. See id. at 234, 199 P. at 300–01. 
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protruding branches or roots, a “landowner owes a duty to act in good 
faith or reasonably to prevent damage to the trees” from which the 
branches or roots come.26 The court also rejected Mustoe’s analogies to 
precedents that recognized duties to prevent the spread of forest fires or 
unwanted surface water.27 Adhering to what it believed was the majority 
rule from other jurisdictions, the court declined to recognize any duty of 
care in removing tree roots or branches.28 
No nuisance. The court also rejected Mustoe’s nuisance claim. While 
it seemed to recognize that otherwise lawful uses of one’s own property 
can be actionable as nuisances when they unreasonably interfere with 
others’ use of their property, it believed that Mustoe’s nuisance claim 
merely duplicated her “negligence claim.”29 And because Washington 
does not allow otherwise unsuccessful negligence claims to be dressed 
up as nuisance claims, Mustoe’s nuisance claim must fail.30 
No timber trespass. Mustoe had also asserted a claim under 
Washington’s timber-trespass statute, which creates a civil cause of 
action against anyone who shall “cut down, girdle, or otherwise injure, 
or carry off any tree, . . . timber, or shrub on the land of another 
person, . . . without lawful authority.”31 The court of appeals affirmed 
the dismissal of this claim, too, because—given what the court had 
already decided—Jordan had not removed the roots “without lawful 
authority.”32 
III. HOW THE COURT GOT IT WRONG 
The court of appeals’ decision has troubling practical and legal 
consequences. These consequences might be excusable if binding 
precedent compelled the decision, but it did not. To the contrary, 
Gostina v. Ryland—the Washington precedent on which the court most 
heavily relied—can easily be read to impose some limits on neighbors’ 
ability to remove protruding branches and roots. More broadly, the court 
of appeals’ reasoning unsettles Washington nuisance law. 
                                                      
26. Mustoe, 193 Wash. App. at 165, 371 P.3d at 546. 
27. See id. at 165–67, 371 P.3d at 546–47.  
28. See id. at 168, 371 P.3d at 547. 
29. See id. at 169–70, 371 P.3d at 548. I put the phrase “negligence claim” in scare quotes 
because Mustoe asserted that Jordan had also acted “recklessly or intentionally.” Clerk’s Papers at 
7, 30, Mustoe, 193 Wash. App. 161, 371 P.3d 544 (No. 74166-7-I). 
30. See Mustoe, 193 Wash. App. at 170, 371 P.3d at 548. 
31. WASH. REV. CODE § 64.12.030 (2017). 
32. See Mustoe, 193 Wash. App. at 170, 371 P.3d at 548. 
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A. The Decision Has Worrying Practical Consequences  
The court of appeals’ decision has disturbing practical consequences. 
To see why, consider a hypothetical case. Suppose that much of a large 
tree’s root system happens to protrude into adjoining land. And suppose 
that a malicious neighbor who occupies that adjoining land excavates it 
and cuts off the protruding roots. The unsupported tree then falls into the 
home of its owner just a few hours later, destroying the dwelling and 
killing the owner. Under the court of appeals’ holding, the owner’s 
estate would have no civil remedy against the malicious neighbor, 
because the neighbor owed the tree’s owner no duty of care enforceable 
either in nuisance or in tort law more generally. And this is true even 
though the neighbor likely committed manslaughter,33 or perhaps even 
murder.34 
Note that this hypothetical case is only barely hypothetical. In 
Mustoe, if the plaintiff’s evidence is believed, the root cutter said that he 
wanted the two Douglas fir trees to fall onto the tree owner’s house.35 
The principal difference between Mustoe and the hypothetical would 
then be that the hypothetical tree fell down. But that difference is a 
matter of time and chance. If a powerful windstorm had come upon the 
trees in Mustoe before their owner had the opportunity to remove them, 
they might well have fallen. 
The court of appeals’ decision also gives malicious neighbors a 
powerful weapon to wield against other landowners. If spiteful 
neighbors do not want adjoining landowners to repaint their house in a 
different color, or put up a fence, or keep a dog, they may now use the 
roots and branches that extend into their land as hostages. They may 
now threaten wholesale destruction of those roots or branches, even if 
that destruction would render a tree dangerous to its owner or to valuable 
structures on the owner’s property. By arming malicious landowners 
with credible threats of physical harm and financial injury, the court of 
                                                      
33. The malicious neighbor caused the tree owner’s death at least with criminal negligence, and 
more likely with recklessness. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.070(1) (“A person is guilty of 
manslaughter in the second degree when, with criminal negligence, he or she causes the death of 
another person.”); id. § 9A.32.060(1) (first-degree manslaughter includes “recklessly caus[ing] the 
death of another person”); id. § 9A.08.010(1)(c), (d) (defining the mental states of recklessness and 
criminal negligence). 
34. If the root cutter merely expected the tree to fall over, the crime would likely be 
manslaughter. See supra note 33. If the root cutter expected the tree to fall over, knowing that it 
might well kill the neighbor, the crime would likely be murder. See WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 9A.32.030(1)(b). 
35. See Clerk’s Papers at 137, ¶ 3, Mustoe, 193 Wash. App. 161, 371 P.3d 544 (No. 74166-7-I). 
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appeals’ decision allows them to keep their neighbors under their thumb. 
Malice, moreover, does not arise in a social vacuum. In Mustoe, for 
example, if the plaintiff’s evidence is believed, the root cutter’s actions 
were motivated at least in part by gender—by Jordan’s resentment that 
Mustoe, a woman, had rejected his romantic attentions.36 As the record 
in Mustoe suggests, malice may often stem not only from individualized 
ill-will, but also from a more general kind of animus. To empower 
malicious neighbors, as Mustoe did, is necessarily to empower that kind 
of animus as well. 
B. Precedent Did Not Force the Court’s Hand 
Precedent did not make Mustoe’s result inevitable. The court itself 
never pointed to any binding precedent that compelled its conclusion; at 
most, it pointed to a lack of precedent that compelled an opposite 
conclusion.37 And Washington precedent can easily be read to impose 
reasonable limits on a landowner’s power to remove protruding tree 
roots. 
Mustoe relied most heavily on Gostina v. Ryland, which held that 
protruding branches can constitute a nuisance as long as they cause some 
minimal amount of damage—shedding leaves onto a neighbor’s lawn, 
for example.38 Gostina also held that when branches protrude into 
another’s property, the adjoining landowner may exercise self-help by 
cutting back the branches to the property line.39 
But Gostina also included an important proviso: in trimming 
protruding branches and roots, the landowner may not remove the tree 
itself.40 Quoting a then-contemporary treatise with approval, Gostina 
said that a landowner may cut off branches that extend over his land, 
                                                      
36. See supra notes 13–18 and accompanying text. 
37. See Mustoe, 193 Wash. App. at 165, 371 P.3d at 546 (“We . . . decline to extend Washington 
law as Mustoe proposes.”); id. (precedent “neither asserts nor implies” limits on a landowner’s 
ability to remove encroaching roots and branches); id. at 165–66, 371 P.3d at 546 (rejecting an 
analogy to the duty to prevent the spread of fire); id. at 167, 371 P.3d at 547 (deeming “inapt” an 
analogy to the “common enemy” doctrine, which concerns surface water); id. at 167–68, 371 P.3d at 
547 (examining precedent from other jurisdictions for guidance). 
38. See 116 Wash. 228, 233–34, 199 P. 298, 300 (1921).  
39. In Mustoe, there was no evidence that the tree roots were causing Jordan’s property any 
damage at all. While Jordan told his neighbor that the trees were diseased, an arborist testified that 
there was no evidence of disease. Clerk’s Papers at 67–68, Mustoe, 193 Wash. App. 161, 371 P.3d 
544 (No. 74166-7-I). In litigation, Jordan also claimed (without providing physical evidence) that 
the tree roots were damaging his house’s foundation, but a structural engineer retained by the 
plaintiff called this claim “specious and without any merit.” Id. at 150. 
40. See 116 Wash. at 232, 199 P. at 300. 
File0001.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/10/2018  4:11 PM 
2018] RADICAL JURISPRUDENCE 55 
 
“but he may not cut down the tree, neither can he cut the branches 
thereof beyond the extent to which they overhang his soil.”41 
Gostina’s proviso can be read to prohibit exactly what the root cutter 
in Mustoe did. Gostina recognized a duty not to “cut down the tree” 
itself.42 This duty ought to include a subsidiary duty not to remove so 
many branches or roots that the tree stands a high risk of falling over. 
Otherwise, a neighbor, while prohibited from cutting down a tree 
directly, could cut the tree down indirectly by removing its roots or 
branches.43 
The point is not that this reading of Gostina is logically inescapable. 
The point is that this reading is reasonable—the court of appeals, 
consistently with stare decisis, could have adopted it. Mustoe’s holding 
was, in that sense, an unforced error. 
Oddly, at the same time as the Mustoe Court read Washington 
precedent narrowly, it read Alvarez v. Katz,44 a nonbinding case, broadly. 
In Alvarez, the Vermont Supreme Court held that landowners had the 
right to remove half the roots and branches from a tree whose trunk 
stood on the adjoining lot—even though the removal would result in the 
tree’s premature death, “perhaps within five years and probably within 
ten.”45 Mustoe relied heavily on this holding.46 Alvarez gives no hint, 
though, that the tree’s premature death would endanger person or 
property (beyond the tree itself, of course). Because the cutting in 
Alvarez did not create any risk of personal injury or property damage, it 
did not raise the question whether landowners owe their neighbors a tort 
duty to prevent certain risks when they cut back protruding roots or 
branches. That is perhaps why Alvarez stressed that questions of tort 
duty were not before it: “[p]otential limitations requiring that such 
removal”—i.e., the removal of trees or branches—”be done reasonably 
and not negligently are not before the Court here.”47 Whatever else 
Alvarez may stand for, it does not directly support Mustoe’s holding that 
neighbors owe no duty of care when they remove protruding tree 
                                                      
41. See id. (quoting HORACE WOOD, THE LAW OF NUISANCES § 108 (3d ed. 1893)). 
42. Id. 
43. Cf. Herring v. Pelayo, 198 Wash. App. 828, 839, 397 P.3d 125, 130 (2017) (“We discern no 
meaningful distinction between cutting down a tree and trimming a tree in a manner intended to kill 
the tree.”). For more on this decision, see infra notes 63–64 and accompanying text. 
44. 124 A.3d 839 (Vt. 2015). 
45. Id. at 841. 
46. Mustoe v. Ma, 193 Wash. App. 161, 168, 371 P.3d 544, 547 (2016) (citing Alvarez, 124 A.3d 
at 843). 
47. Alvarez, 124 A.3d at 845. 
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branches or roots. 
C. The Decision Distorts the Law of Nuisance 
The court of appeals’ decision also departed from foundational 
principles of nuisance law. 
In discussing Mustoe’s nuisance claim, the court first concluded that 
because Mustoe had “no legally recognized right” to the removed tree 
roots, she necessarily had “no action for nuisance.”48 The meaning of 
this statement is not entirely clear. On one possible reading, the court is 
begging the question—asserting that Mustoe had no nuisance claim 
because Jordan had not invaded her right to be free from nuisance. On a 
more charitable reading, the court may be saying that Mustoe could not 
assert a nuisance claim because the tree roots were no longer on her 
property, having protruded into somebody else’s. Mustoe, the court said, 
could not complain about “the lawful removal of the roots on Ma’s 
property.”49 But the roots’ location should not have precluded a nuisance 
claim. Their location was the essence of a nuisance claim. A nuisance 
claim, by its nature, operates outside my land, and asserts that I have the 
right to stop you from using your land in a way that unreasonably 
interferes with my enjoyment of mine.50 
Puzzlingly, the court of appeals did seem to recognize that an 
otherwise lawful use of one’s own land can become a nuisance if it 
unreasonably interferes with others’ use and enjoyment of their 
property.51 But it rejected Mustoe’s nuisance claim because, it said, one 
cannot disguise an unsuccessful negligence claim in the garb of 
nuisance.52 This reasoning ignores the nature of Mustoe’s allegations, 
which, as the court had already recited, asserted that Jordan had acted 
with recklessness and maliciousness—not merely with negligence.53 
Still, the court of appeals was right to see a conceptual connection 
between Mustoe’s nuisance claim and its ruling on her negligence claim. 
                                                      
48. Mustoe, 193 Wash. App. at 169, 371 P.3d at 548.  
49. Id. (emphasis added). 
50. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private 
Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1464 (1996) (“Nuisance doctrine expressly qualifies property 
rights by reference to their effects on other property owners and on the public at large. It is premised 
on the notion that any action, if taken to the extreme, may become unlawful.”). 
51. See Mustoe, 193 Wash. App. at 169, 371 P.3d at 548 (“Mustoe correctly argues, however, that 
even if Jordan acted lawfully in severing the tree roots, however, he may still commit a nuisance if 
in so doing he unreasonably interfered with her use and enjoyment of her property.”). 
52. Id. at 169–70, 371 P.3d at 548. 
53. Id. at 164, 371 P.3d at 545. 
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By holding that someone who removes protruding tree roots or branches 
has no duty of care to the owner of the tree, the court of appeals 
necessarily held that such actions are off-limits to a nuisance claim. 
Jordan, the court was saying, owed Mustoe no duty to act reasonably in 
removing the tree roots.54 And if removing tree roots cannot be legally 
unreasonable, then their removal can never make out a claim for 
nuisance, which requires proof that the conduct allegedly constituting 
the nuisance is unreasonable.55 The Mustoe Court thus categorically 
excluded the removal of protruding roots and branches from the reach of 
nuisance law. 
Washington’s law of nuisance, though, categorically excludes very 
few, if any, uses of property from its reach. Washington has codified 
nuisance in what its highest court has called an “expansive[]” 
definition56 that does not explicitly exclude any conduct, use, or activity 
from its reach. Instead, it reaches any “act or omission” that “annoys, 
injures or endangers the comfort, repose, health or safety of others, 
offends decency, . . . or in any way renders other persons insecure in life, 
or in the use of property.”57 It is this hitherto broad definition of 
nuisance that Mustoe unsettles. 
While Mustoe does muddle Washington’s law of nuisance, it is still 
too early to tell how great a threat it poses to the overall structure of that 
law. Perhaps the decision’s analytical shortcomings and the case’s 
unusual facts will limit its influence. 
In fact, there is some reason to think—or at least to hope—that other 
Washington courts may curb Mustoe’s reach. In the relatively short time 
since its issuance, it has been cited only twice. A federal district court, in 
an unpublished order, cited it in passing for its general (and 
uncontroversial) definition of nuisance.58 The other citation came in 
                                                      
54. See Bodin v. City of Stanwood, 130 Wash. 2d 726, 733, 927 P.2d 240, 244 (1996) (“For 
conduct to be negligent, it must be unreasonable in light of a recognizable danger.”); id. at 735–36, 
927 P.2d at 245–46 (recognizing that negligence is the failure to exercise of reasonable care).  
55. Lakey v. Puget Sound Energy, Inc., 176 Wash. 2d 909, 923, 296 P.3d 860, 867–68 (2013). Of 
course, while nuisance more often refers to a lawful but unreasonable use of property, it also 
includes a narrow category of “nuisance per se.” Nuisance per se, as its name indicates, “is an act, 
thing, omission, or use of property which of itself is a nuisance, and hence is not permissible or 
excusable under any circumstance.” Tiegs v. Watts, 135 Wash. 2d 1, 13, 954 P.2d 877, 883 (1998). 
Gostina teaches, however, that there are plenty of circumstances in which it can be reasonable to 
remove protruding roots and branches, so nuisance per se does not apply here. 
56. Moore v. Steve’s Outboard Serv., 182 Wash. 2d 151, 155, 339 P.3d 169, 171 (2014). 
57. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.48.120 (2017). Washington has another definition of nuisance at 
Washington Revised Code section 7.48.010. These definitions are apparently complementary. See 
Goodrich v. Starrett, 108 Wash. 437, 440, 184 P. 220, 221 (1919).  
58. See City of Everett v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. C17-209RSM, 2017 WL 4236062, at *8 
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Herring v. Pelayo,59 a decision from Division II of the Washington 
Court of Appeals.60 
Herring was about a “boundary tree”61—a tree whose trunk stands 
directly on the property line between adjoining landowners, who thereby 
own the tree in common.62 The Herring Court, though it distinguished 
Mustoe by noting that it did not involve a boundary tree, held that a 
boundary tree’s co-owner has no right to trim its branches in a way that 
he knows will kill the tree.63 This is a promising doctrinal development, 
one that may presage a gradual erosion of Mustoe.64 If, as Herring holds, 
“trimming a tree in a manner intended to kill the tree” is no different 
from cutting it down altogether,65 and if, as the Washington State 
Supreme Court has held, a landowner may not cut down a tree growing 
on his neighbor’s land,66 then, despite Mustoe, there may be some limits 
on how landowners may trim protruding roots and branches. 
D. Why Did the Court of Appeals Err? 
How did the court of appeals go wrong in Mustoe? Its opinion gives a 
clue. At one point, as we have seen, the court seems to assert that 
Mustoe has no nuisance claim because the tree roots were no longer on 
her property when they were cut off and removed.67 Although the court 
then beats a hasty semi-retreat from that assertion,68 the assertion itself is 
telling. 
The assertion suggests that that the court was conceiving of the case 
using the old ad coelum doctrine, under which landowners own 
everything below and above their land.69 Because the roots had left 
                                                      
(W.D. Wash. Sept. 25, 2017). 
59. 198 Wash. App. 828, 397 P.3d 125 (2017). 
60. Mustoe v. Ma, 193 Wash. App. 161, 371 P.3d 544 (2016), by contrast, was issued by Division 
I of the Court of Appeals. See generally In re Personal Restraint of Arnold, __ Wash. 2d __, 410 
P.3d 1133, 1138–41 (2018) (holding that the different divisions of the court of appeals should give 
respectful consideration to, but are not bound by, each other’s decisions). 
61. Also called a “bounded tree.” Bounded Tree, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
62. Happy Bunch, LLC v. Grandview N., LLC, 142 Wash. App. 81, 93, 173 P.3d 959, 965 
(2007). 
63. Herring, 198 Wash. App. at 835–37, 397 P.3d at 128–30. 
64. See id. at 839, 397 P.3d at 130 (“We discern no meaningful distinction between cutting down 
a tree and trimming a tree in a manner intended to kill the tree.”). 
65. Id. 
66. Gostina v. Ryland, 116 Wash. 228, 232, 199 P. 298, 300 (1921). 
67. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text. 
68. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
69. Ad Coelum Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 61.  
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Mustoe’s property, Mustoe had lost her rights in them. Having protruded 
under the land of Mustoe’s neighbor, they had become the neighbor’s 
property, and the neighbor had the absolute right to do what he wished 
with them. This included the right to exclude them from the property 
altogether by cutting them back to the property line. In conceiving of the 
case this way, the court of appeals may have been influenced by Gostina 
v. Ryland, which cited the ad coelum doctrine to support the notion that 
a landowner may cut protruding tree branches back to the property 
line.70 
To the extent the court of appeals was relying on the ad coelum 
doctrine, its reliance was misplaced. The ad coelum doctrine is limited 
by so many exceptions and qualifications that it no longer truly exists.71 
For example, if landowners owned all the space above their land, they 
could prevent planes from invading that space. That, of course, is not the 
law.72 
More fundamentally, the mere fact of ownership—whose physical 
bounds the ad coelum doctrine, if applicable, is meant to determine—
does not give landowners the right to do whatever they like with their 
property. The whole point of nuisance law is that your neighbors have 
some right to dictate what you do with your property.73 This 
foundational principle is what Mustoe ignored. 
IV. SOME CONCLUDING SUGGESTIONS 
Anyone criticizing an opinion ought to give an alternative rule of 
decision. My suggested alternative is easy to state in broad outline: the 
court of appeals should have applied traditional nuisance law. It should 
have recognized that an adjoining landowner’s removal of protruding 
roots or branches, like any other activity on the land, can qualify as a 
nuisance if it substantially and unreasonably interferes with the tree 
owner’s enjoyment of her property. And a tree that poses physical 
danger to people or structures seems, rather self-evidently, to interfere 
substantially and unreasonably with the enjoyment of one’s property. It 
is therefore a nuisance to remove a tree’s protruding roots or branches 
                                                      
70. 116 Wash. at 232, 199 P. at 300. As this Article has mentioned, however, Gostina nowhere 
intimates that this right is unqualified—i.e., that the branch clipper owes no duty to the owner of the 
tree. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text. 
71. See Lord v. Pierce County, 166 Wash. App. 812, 825, 271 P.3d 944, 951 (2012) (rejecting “a 
return to the ancient common law doctrine of cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum”).  
72. Cheskov v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 416, 421–23, 348 P.2d 673, 676–78 (1960).  
73. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
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when it makes the tree physically dangerous. 
In my view, this rule should apply even if the removal of roots or 
branches is occasioned by, say, the construction of a useful building and 
not malice. An activity that causes a tree to become physically 
dangerous ought to internalize the cost of removing the tree or otherwise 
making it safe. It seems inevitable that someone will have to pay to 
remove such a tree, and that cost ought to fall upon the person who 
makes the tree dangerous. If the costs of removing the tree outweigh the 
benefits of the activity that would cause the tree to become dangerous, 
that activity is probably not socially useful.74 
Under that rule, Jordan’s actions in Mustoe would have constituted a 
nuisance. The rule also forestalls the potentially disastrous consequences 
of Mustoe’s holding. It means that a neighbor who commits 
manslaughter-by-tree will not be immune from civil liability.75 
Suppose, however, that protruding roots or branches are causing some 
amount of damage to a neighbor’s land. Now suppose that the neighbor 
cuts those roots or branches back to the property line, causing the tree to 
become physically dangerous. Who is liable to whom, and for what? We 
know from Gostina v. Ryland that protruding roots or branches become a 
nuisance if they cause even minor damage.76 I have also argued that, to 
avoid repugnant consequences, Gostina is best read to make it a 
compensable nuisance to remove protruding roots and branches if that 
removal renders the tree physically dangerous.77 Hence, in these 
circumstances, there are two separate nuisances, one arising from the 
protruding roots or branches, and another arising from the physically 
dangerous tree. Recognizing both, and offsetting the resulting damages 
against each other, is consistent with Gostina and avoids the flaws of 
Mustoe. 
While this two-nuisance situation is intellectually attention-grabbing, 
the chance seems low that it would actually materialize—at least in the 
                                                      
74. I am assuming that the tree owner will receive damages but will not be entitled to an 
injunction against the construction of the building. This assumption is in keeping with Washington 
law, which will deny an injunction even in a nuisance case when it would be inequitable. The case 
law suggests that an injunction is inequitable when it would prevent a use of property that, though it 
causes compensable harm to a neighbor, is socially useful. See, e.g., Mattson v. Defiance Lumber 
Co., 154 Wash. 503, 512–13, 282 P. 848, 851 (1929) (awarding damages to neighboring property 
owner, but not an injunction, in a nuisance action against a nearby sawmill, due to the economic 
importance of the lumber industry). In the absence of unusual circumstances, therefore, courts 
would be unlikely to enjoin the construction of a useful building. 
75. See supra section III.A. 
76. 116 Wash. 228, 234–35, 199 P. 298, 300–01 (1921). 
77. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.  
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absence of a malicious neighbor. It is easy to imagine circumstances in 
which protruding roots or branches may cause damage to a neighbor. 
Roots may begin to invade a neighbor’s concrete foundation. Branches 
may begin to block the sun from shining on a neighbor’s vegetable 
garden. It is comparatively difficult to imagine why fixing that sort of 
problem would require a rational person to remove so many roots or 
branches that a tree becomes physically dangerous. 
But what if removal of roots or branches does not render a tree 
physically dangerous to life, limb, or buildings? What if it merely kills 
or damages the tree? Mere harm to a tree, without more, resembles the 
kind of aesthetic harm that Washington courts have been wary of 
recognizing as a nuisance.78 The outright death of a tree may be 
different, but even here a court would have to balance the value of the 
tree against the value of whatever activity led the neighbor to remove the 
roots or branches.79 I do not mean to suggest a particular outcome for 
these cases, which lie outside the scope of this Article. I do suggest that 
they can be resolved by applying traditional principles of nuisance law. 
Finally, I should acknowledge that the precise rule of legal liability 
between neighbors usually will not matter. Most neighbors make some 
effort to get along with each other. To these neighbors, the precise rule 
of legal liability will be mostly irrelevant, not only because most people 
have imprecise legal knowledge, but also because most neighbors are 
not Holmesian “bad men.”80 Rather than figuring out what they can get 
away with, they will reach an accommodation with their neighbors that 
will be shaped more by extralegal norms than by legal rules.81 
By contrast, the rule will matter where one neighbor hates another. 
There, applying the traditional rules of nuisance in the way I have 
suggested here will at least remove one weapon from a malicious 
                                                      
78. See Collinson v. John L. Scott, Inc., 55 Wash. App. 481, 483–88, 778 P.2d 534, 536–38 
(1989) (holding that new condominiums that blocked the neighbors’ view did not constitute a 
nuisance). Collinson shows that certain harms may fall categorically outside the realm of nuisance 
law, but it does not hold that certain activities fall categorically outside the realm of nuisance law. It 
thus does not support Mustoe’s holding that the removal of protruding roots can never be a 
nuisance. 
79. See Lakey v. Puget Sound Energy, Inc., 176 Wash. 2d 909, 923, 296 P.3d 860, 868 (2013) 
(whether an activity is a nuisance is determined “by weighing the harm to the aggrieved party 
against the social utility of the activity”). In principle, even the manslaughter-by-tree case would 
require a court to “balance” the tree owner’s death against the value of whatever activity led the 
neighbor to remove the tree roots. But it seems safe to assume that in such a case the balance would 
always tip against the root cutter. 
80. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897). 
81. See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among 
Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986). 
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neighbor’s armory. 
 
